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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The caption on this brief accurately lists the plaintiff and defendant in the jury trial 
below. Another defendant, Dean B. Johnson, D.D.S., settled immediately prior to the 
jury trial. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant agrees with Plaintiffs statement of jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW1 
1. The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in allowing Dr. 
Walker, as a stipulated expert, to testify regarding the call he received from 
plaintiffs post-operative oral surgeon. Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue for 
appeal because her objection did not address Utah R. Evid. 703. Alternatively, any 
error was harmless. Standard of Review: The trial court is allowed considerable latitude 
of discretion in the admissibility of expert testimony, and in the absence of a clear 
showing of abuse its decision will not be reversed. Lamb v. Bangart 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 
1974). Ordinarily, the failure to properly preserve an issue for appeal by means of an 
objection in the trial court, stating the specific grounds for the objection, constitutes a 
waiver of that issue. Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). Furthermore, Plaintiff has the duty of 
showing that the error, if there was one, affected a substantial right. Utah R. Evid. 103. 
2. The trial court properly clarified an insurance pre-authorization issue 
after plaintiff repeatedly created a false impression by unfairly taking advantage of 
a motion in limine barring evidence of insurance. Alternatively, any error was 
1
 Rule 24(a)(5) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that for each 
statement of the issue presented for review, each party must state the "standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority; and (A) citation to the record showing that the 
issue was preserved in the trial court; or (B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of 
an issue not preserved in the trial court." Plaintiff/Appellant has failed to meet these 
requirements. 
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harmless. Standard of Review: The propriety of jury instructions generally presents a 
question of law, which is reviewed under a correction of error standard. State v. 
Clements, 967 P.2d 957, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, a trial court is given broad 
discretion in overseeing the evidence that is presented in the courtroom and has a function 
beyond sitting as a comparatively silent monitor of the proceedings. The trial court has 
the prerogative to clarify or explain the evidence as it relates to the disputed issues. 
Cintron v. Milkovich. 611 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1980). See also Poulsen v. Frear, 946 
P.2d 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (trial judge showed no biased in taking active role in how 
evidence was presented). Furthermore, Plaintiff has the duty of showing that the error, if 
there was one, affected a substantial right. Utah R. Evid. 103. 
3. The trial court correctly instructed the jury at the close of evidence that 
the jury should consider all of the evidence in determining negligence. Alternatively, 
any error was harmless. Standard of Review: Challenges to jury instructions are 
generally reviewed under a "correctness" standard. Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 
862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993). However, "[fjailure to give a requested jury 
instruction constitutes reversible error only if [its] omission tends to mislead the jury to 
the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on 
the law." Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Even if the Court 
determines error occurred, the Court will reverse only if plaintiff demonstrates that there 
is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the case. State v. 
Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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4. The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying the 
plaintiffs motion for a new trial and motion for mistrial. Standard of Review: 
Because the grant of a new trial is ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court, 
the decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Rukavina v. Triatlantic 
Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 126 (Utah 1997). Similarly, the appropriate standard in 
reviewing the trial court's denial of a mistrial motion is whether the court abused its 
discretion. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997). If the trial court, in its 
discretion, concluded that the complained-of incident probably did not prejudice the jury, 
then it properly denied the motion. Id. at 1230-31. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Rule of Evidence 703 provides: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the 
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Dr. Crayton Walker, M.D. ("Dr. Walker") is a board certified oral and 
maxillofacial surgeon who has practiced in the Salt Lake Valley for nearly twenty years. 
Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Walker by her orthodontist (a former defendant), Dean B. 
Johnson, DDS ("Dr. Johnson"), who indicated that, although she had worn braces for 
eight years, her problems could not be helped through traditional orthodontics. Plaintiff 
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had severe facial skeletal deformities, including a nonfunctional bite and a protrusiveness 
that, in her own words, made her "look like a monkey." She also had an extensive 
psychiatric history that she did not disclose to Dr. Walker or Dr. Johnson. 
Dr. Walker referred plaintiff back to Dr. Johnson to determine if additional 
orthodontics could avoid surgery. Two years later, after her condition continued to 
worsen, and after plaintiff was thoroughly advised of potential risks, Dr. Walker 
performed surgery to retract plaintiffs upper jaw. He successfully repaired plaintiffs 
bite and lessened her protrusiveness. Although she appeared pleased with the result for 
some nine months, plaintiff eventually requested additional cosmetic surgery to her face. 
Dr. Walker performed a "lip lift" and while plaintiff again seemed pleased for a time, she 
eventually wanted additional cosmetic surgery. Believing that the potential benefits no 
longer outweighed the risks, Dr. Walker declined to perform a third procedure. 
Plaintiff then sued Dr. Walker and Dr. Johnson for medical malpractice. On the 
evening before trial, Dentist Johnson settled and the matter continued to trial against Dr. 
Walker. After six days of evidence, the jury unanimously concluded that Dr. Walker had 
not been negligent. This appeal followed. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
1. Plaintiff filed her Complaint in February 1993 against Dr. Walker and Dr. 
Johnson alleging in part that both defendants failed to properly treat plaintiff for her 
severe facial skeletal deformities. (R3) 
2. Dr. Walker answered alleging that plaintiff was fully advised regarding the 
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surgery she had requested treatment she was provided and that the treatment was 
appropriate and within the requisite standard of care. (R.95-96) 
3. On the evening before trial, plaintiff and Dr. Johnson settled. (R.783P.586) 
4. Dr. Walker defended his care before a jury. The trial ran from April 3 
through April 11, 1997. (R.356,538-43) 
5. In response to the special verdict form question, "Did Dr. Walker breach the 
applicable standard of care?" the jury unanimously responded "No." (R.681) (Appendix 
i) 
6. The Court signed a final "Judgment on the Verdict" on May 27, 1997. 
(R. 723-25) (Appendix 2) 
7. Plaintiff moved for a new trial. (R.717) Dr. Walker opposed plaintiffs 
motion. (R.730) The matter was submitted to the Court without oral argument, and the 
Court denied plaintiffs motion. (R.744, 750) 
8. With new counsel, plaintiff filed her notice of appeal. (R.752) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. Walker objects to a number of plaintiff s alleged "facts" which are not 
individually numbered or supported by citations to the record as required by Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(7). Moreover, although in this appeal from a jury verdict, all facts and inferences 
must be viewed in a light most favorable to Dr. Walker, Reese v. Intermountain Health 
Care. Inc.. 808 P.2d 1069,1073 (Utah 1991), plaintiff has stated the facts in her favor and 
"argues" in her fact section that the Court committed numerous errors. For this reason, 
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Dr. Walker has been required to compile a detailed summary of the trial testimony. 
A. Facts Regarding the Medical Evidence 
1. Prior to the introduction of testimony, the District Court instructed the 
jurors that (1) they should keep an open mind and not form any opinions until the closing 
of testimony, (2) they should not draw any adverse inferences from objections that were 
sustained, (3) certain evidence is admitted for a limited purpose only and must be 
considered only for that limited purpose, (4) their consideration of the evidence should 
include all of the testimony and evidence received, and (5) neither the Court nor anyone 
else could invade their responsibility to determine the facts. (R.783P.81-89) 
2. At trial Dr. Johnson testified in part: 
A. He was the third orthodontist to work on plaintiff, she had eight 
years of such care (R.783P. 153-54), she had extensive dental 
problems dating to her adolescence, and was missing a number of 
her molars, making it very challenging to address her problems. 
(R.783P.161-62) 
B. Plaintiff had stated that she did not like her facial profile and 
forcefully complained that "I look like a monkey." (R.783P.150, 
R.783P. 17,61) Her protrusive profile caused her teeth to push 
unnaturally against her lips (R.783P. 130-32,158) and beyond the 
obvious cosmetic problems, a protrusion can strip away one's gums 
and cause loss of the roots of her teeth. (R.783,P.54) 
C. Plaintiff also suffered from a lack of function and poor bite due to 
her many missing teeth. (R.783P. 163-65) Her mouth was slightly 
asymmetrical with her left side slightly lower than her right. 
(R.783,P.180) 
D. Plaintiff was not compliant with her orthodontic treatment. 
(R.784,P.6) She often failed to keep her appointments, take care of 
her appliances, wear her elastics, and things of that nature. 
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(R.784,P.6-7,49) On a scale between 1-10 in treating this patient, 10 
being the worse, Dr. Johnson would put plaintiff at a 9.5 and Dr. 
Johnson has yet to see 10. (R.783,P.60) 
E. Plaintiff wanted to get out of her braces and resolve all of her dental 
problems as soon as possible. (R.783P. 172-73) Dr. Johnson 
recommended a surgical approach (R.783,PP. 138-39) In September 
1989, Dr. Johnson referred Plaintiff to Dr. Walker. (R.783,P.141) 
Plaintiff eventually determined that she should undergo the surgery 
because it would speed up her dental treatment. (R.783,PP. 182-83) 
F. Dr. Johnson and Dr. Walker discussed plaintiffs case on several 
occasions and spent a lot of time preparing plaintiff for surgery and 
the risks thereof. (R.783,P.183) Once plaintiff made the 
determination to have surgery, she wanted to pursue it as rapidly as 
possible for, among other things, financial considerations. 
(R.783,P.184) 
G. Following Dr. Walker's surgery, plaintiff had achieved an excellent 
result and her teeth had been moved to an "almost ideal" position. 
(R.783,P.147,186-87,191) 
H. Plaintiff did not indicate any dissatisfaction with her surgical result 
on her two follow-up visits. (R.783,P.189) In fact, it was not until 
May 16, 1991, some nine months following the surgery, that plaintiff 
expressed some concern about her appearance. (R.783,P.189) 
I. Dr. Walker attempted to alleviate Plaintiffs concerns through a 
minor procedure on her upper lip. (R.783,P.149) Following the 
surgery, plaintiff and Dr. Johnson she seemed very happy with the 
result. (R.783,P.10) 
J. Subsequently, plaintiff again expressed dissatisfaction with her 
appearance. (R.783,PP. 193-94) Plaintiff had a tendency to strain 
her upper lip which gave her an unnatural smile unless she relaxed. 
(R.783,P.194;R.784,P.8) 
K. Dr. Johnson referred plaintiff to a speech pathologist (R.783,P. 195) 
who determined that "her whole personality is contributing to the 
accumulated anxiety centered around her teeth and lips, and 
preventing her from using facial muscles expressively." (R.784,P.9) 
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When she was relaxed, her appearance seemed very, very normal. 
(R.783,P.10,18) Although the speech pathologist recommended 
certain exercises, plaintiff was not satisfied with those 
recommendations and stopped the exercises after a short time. 
(P.10) 
L. Plaintiff then saw another oral surgeon, Grant Cannon, DDS MD 
who called Dr. Johnson and opined that plaintiff had obtained a very 
acceptable result. (R.783,P.14) 
M. While he was treating plaintiff, Dr. Johnson had been aware that she 
was taking some medications for anxiety but he was unaware of her 
psychological profile or prior psychiatric treatment. (R.783,PP.14-
15) Plaintiff had not told Dr. Johnson that she was taking numerous 
psychiatric drugs, had been diagnosed as having bi-polar disorder 
(R.783,PP.15-16), had been receiving psychological treatment since 
age twenty-one, had been diagnosed with significant emotional 
swings, had been diagnosed as being non-compliant with medication, 
had been suicidal, and had an anxiety disorder, a borderline 
personality disorder, and was involved in counseling with numerous 
other health care providers. (R.783,PP. 16-17) 
N. Photographs following Dr. Walker's surgery indicate that plaintiff 
had achieved a lack of protrusion, a straighter profile, a normal 
smile, a very nice facial appearance (R.783,P.29), and a nicely 
balanced, fully functional dentition, good arch form, and nice 
positioning of teeth. (R.783,P.31) 
O. Dr. Johnson concluded that all of the treatment he and Dr. Walker 
performed was thorough and appropriate, their goals were met and, 
even in hindsight, he would treat plaintiff in the same way. 
(R.783,PP.34-35) 
3. Defendant Dr. Walker then testified: 
A. Dr. Walker was board certified by the American Board of Oral and 
Maxillofacial Surgery and has been in private practice in that 
specialty since July 1981 in Salt Lake City. (R.783,P.96) Dr. 
Walker was the head of oral maxillofacial surgery at Holy Cross 
Hospital (1984-87) and LDS Hospital (1985-87). He has been the 
president of the Utah Society of Oral Maxillofacial Surgeons from 
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1986-88. Medical doctors who are also oral surgeons are rather rare, 
there being only four to five in the State of Utah. (R.783,P.97) 
B. When Dr. Walker was first contacted about the patient, Dr. Johnson 
explained that he was having a difficult time using conventional 
orthodontics on plaintiff. (R.783,P.65) 
C. Plaintiff came to see Dr. Walker in September 1988. (R.787,P.172) 
The first words out of her mouth were that she looked "like a 
monkey" and that she wanted her dental protrusion reduced 
surgically so she could get out of her braces. (R.783,P.69,71,80) Dr. 
Walker responded by informing plaintiff that before surgery could be 
considered, there was a lot more orthodontic work that needed to be 
done. (R.783,PP.74) 
D. On October 26, 1988, plaintiff called and asked Dr. Walker's office 
to draft a pre-authorization letter for the surgery to her insurance 
company. (R.787,PP.183) 
E. Plaintiff returned to Dr. Walker in September 1990, two years later. 
(R.783,P.75) He had a one hour meeting with plaintiff, plaintiffs 
husband, and Dr. Johnson. (R.783,P.76) Plaintiffs main concern 
was to get out of her braces and to complete her treatment. 
(R.783,P.78) She was also concerned about financial considerations. 
(R.783,PP.78-79) Dr. Walker showed her the orthodontic models to 
predict what her surgery would accomplish and a prediction tracing 
of changes to her teeth and facial profile. (R.787,P. 184) Dr. Walker 
provided plaintiff a brochure on jaw surgery explaining in lay terms 
what the surgery would attempt to accomplish. (R.787,P. 187) 
F. Dr. Walker rated plaintiffs case a 9 out of 10 on a difficulty scale. 
He appropriately warned plaintiff of the significant risks from the 
surgery and she signed written consent forms to that effect. 
(R.787,P.239) He spent more time consulting with Dr. Johnson and 
plaintiff on this case than on any case he has ever participated in. 
(R.783,P.98) Dr. Walker made no guarantee as to the results of her 
treatment. (R.783,P.82) 
G. The surgery provided plaintiff with an excellent occlusion or bite 
(R.787,P.243), and lessened her protrusive profile. 
(R.783,p.84;R.787,P.239,245) 
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H. Dr. Walker felt that plaintiff looked very good and that she should 
not have been concerned about her looks. However, he tried to help 
resolve her concerns by sending her to a speech pathologist and 
performing a lip lift surgery at no cost to her. (R.783,P.90) 
I. The speech pathologist to whom Dr. Walker sent plaintiff thought 
plaintiff had a very acceptable result and smile, but reported that 
plaintiff was totally self-centered, focused on her mouth and lips, and 
needed to relax. Plaintiff refused to perform the exercises requested 
of the speech pathologist. (R.787,PP.240-41) 
J. Dr. Walker discouraged further surgery because it would involve 
major changes to plaintiffs face and would require taking bone 
grafts from her hip for very little potential improvement. He was 
also concerned that plaintiff was unstable emotionally and may never 
be happy with her appearance. (R.783,P.93-94) 
K. Plaintiff had never informed Dr. Walker about her extensive 
psychiatric history dating back to age twenty-one. Had he known 
about this extensive history, he would not have treated this patient 
because given the history, it would have been almost predictable that 
the patient would not like the result. (R.787,P. 177-79) 
4. Alan Jensen DDS, plaintiffs subsequent treating orthodontist, testified: 
A. It is rare for a patient to undergo eight years of orthodontics without 
having her problems corrected. (R.784,P. 189) 
B. Plaintiff never disclosed to Dr. Jensen any of her extensive 
psychiatric problems and that she had threatened suicide on more 
than one occasion. (R.784,PP. 183-84) Dr. Jensen stated that 
psychiatric or psychological treatment is an important thing to 
discuss with an orthodontist or treatment provider who may be doing 
some modification of a facial structure. (R.784,P.151) 
C. Dr. Jensen stated that Plaintiff had a very functional mouth following 
Dr. Walker's surgery. (R.784,P.154) 
D. Over defendant's objection, Plaintiffs counsel asked Dr. Jensen 
what another treating physician (Dr. Baldwin) had told him with 
regard to the surgery. (R.784,P.202) 
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5. Dr. Stephen O. Wright, plaintiffs general dentist, testified that plaintiff had 
expected the changes to her profile that resulted from Dr. Walker's surgery. 
(R.784,PP.222-23) Dr. Wright testified that he thought the plaintiffs appearance was 
better following Dr. Walker's surgery than it was during later follow-up treatment she 
sought. (R.784,P.225) 
6. Marilyn Lambright, plaintiffs cousin, testified that prior to Dr. Walker's 
surgery, people had told the plaintiff that she had a "monkey face." (R.784,PP. 241-42) 
Plaintiff had been in braces for such a long time that they were almost a way of life for 
her. (R.784,P.242) Plaintiff was concerned about how she looked wearing braces and 
was teased in high school about her appearance. (R.784,P.244) 
7. Plaintiffs oral surgery expert Dr. Lewis Guernsey testified: 
A. He is a retired oral surgeon from Pennsylvania (R.785,P.10), is not a 
physician (R.785,P.18), had not worked in an office setting outside 
of a university or hospital since 1961 (R.785JPP.18-19), and had 
never performed as the lead surgeon the surgery Dr. Walker 
performed on plaintiff. (R.785,PP. 19-20) 
B. He had never had a patient who had been in orthodontics eight to 
nine years. (R.785,P.60) 
C. He was not experienced in determining risks involved in a case 
where a surgeon is treating a patient with a psychiatric history that 
has not been fully disclosed. (R.785,PP.61-62) 
D. He did not consider himself to be an expert on the tracings of 
plaintiffs mouth and the type of analysis Dr. Walker had used in 
treating plaintiff. (R.785,PP. 62-63) 
E. He was unsure if the standard of care is the same for an M.D. oral 
surgeon versus oral surgeons who are not physicians. (R.785,P.65) 
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F. He had not reviewed a number of Plaintiff s records and was 
unaware that before Dr. Walker did surgery on plaintiff, she had 
obtained a second opinion from another board certified M.D. oral 
surgeon, Dr. Grant Cannon. (R.785,P.67,77) 
G. A surgeon has a right to expect that a patient will answer questions 
candidly and respond truthfully so that the oral surgeon can rely 
upon the history before treatment is begun. (R.785,P.88) 
H. It was plaintiff who chose to have surgery by Dr. Walker and signed 
a consent form to have him operate and Dr. Walker appropriately 
tried to prepare the patient for what she would look like post-surgery. 
(R.785,PP.92,110) 
8. Plaintiff testified: 
A. She began in orthodontics when she was twelve, and had been 
treated by three different orthodontists. (R.785,P.134-35) She felt 
she was maxillary protrusive and certain boys in high school would 
make monkey sounds around her. (R.785,PP. 137-38) 
B. When she first went to Dr. Johnson, plaintiff stated that her profile 
bothered her and she told him that she felt like she looked like a 
monkey. Other people had also told her that. (R.787,PP50-51,146) 
Plaintiff also saw Dr. Johnson because she was having difficulty 
masticating her food due to her facial and skeletal deformities. 
(R.787,P.49) 
C. Dr. Johnson discussed with plaintiff advantages and disadvantages of 
surgery because he determined he could not achieve a satisfactory 
result with the orthodontic treatment alone. (R.787,P.52) 
D. When plaintiff first saw Dr. Walker, she was discouraged about how 
long she had been in braces. She repeated the monkey comment. 
(R.787,P.52) 
E. Plaintiff immediately asked Dr. Walker to write an insurance pre-
authorization letter for her about the need for surgery. (R.787.P.53) 
She was anxious to have the surgery as soon as possible because of 
financial considerations. (R.787,PP.56-57) 
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F. She does not remember disclosing to Dr. Walker any psychological 
or psychiatric counseling she had received (R.786,P.225), although 
she began seeking help for emotional problems at age twenty-two 
(R.785,P.168), continued to have depression and was diagnosed as 
manic-depressive. (R.785,P.170) Plaintiff had been receiving 
extensive psychiatric care for the seven years prior to Dr. Walker's 
treatment of her (R.786,P.173), and had feelings of not being 
accepted and fears of other people's judgment. (R.786,P. 174) She 
had attempted suicide (R.786,P.176), and both of her parents had 
suffered from mental illness. (R.786,P.227) She also did not disclose 
to Dr. Walker that she had a history of recurrent mood instability, 
depressive thoughts, anxiety, tense personal relationships, or suicidal 
ideation. (R.786,P.230) She did not remember disclosing to him 
that she was easily agitated and wanted to direct her own treatment, 
among other numerous conditions. (R.786,P.231 -34) 
G. Plaintiff went to Dr. Cannon for a second opinion before the surgery 
and Dr. Cannon agreed with the plan that Dr. Walker had advised. 
(R.787,P.65-66;R.785,pp. 179-80) 
H. At the time of Dr. Walker's surgery, Plaintiff worked as a 
medical/dental claims processor and as a dental insurance specialist 
and continues to work for a dental group. (R.786,P.235; 
R.785,P.133) She knew that it was important to accurately fill out 
forms that are provided by health care professionals. (R.786,P.236) 
Despite this, she intentionally stated to second opinion surgeon Dr. 
Cannon and subsequent treating orthodontist Dr. Jensen that she had 
no medical problems and did not disclose any medications that she 
had been taking, although she was then being treated for psychiatric 
issues. (R.786,P.236-38) 
I. In her deposition responses, plaintiff listed having been to fifty-eight 
health care providers since 1980, twenty-three of whom were 
dentists, oral surgeons, endodontists, and orthodontists. (R.787,P.98) 
J. Prior to the surgery, Dr. Walker showed plaintiff what he predicted 
her profile would look like following the surgery. (R.787,P.59) Dr. 
Johnson also participated in that conversation. (R.787,P.59) Both 
doctors took considerable time talking to plaintiff about the risks and 
options of the surgery and answering her questions. (R.787,P.60-63) 
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K. Plaintiff understood that she was undergoing major jaw surgery to 
correct her cross-bite and reduce her profile. (R.785,PP. 144-45) 
Dr. Walker discussed with her the possible risks and problems that 
could be related to the surgery. (R.785,P.145) 
L. Plaintiff testified that Dr. Walker and Dr. Johnson warned her that 
they couldn't predict exactly what her profile would look like but 
that it would change. (R.787,P.70,87) She signed two written 
consent forms, one for Dr. Walker and another for the hospital in 
which the surgery was performed. (R.787,PP.70-71) In that form, 
she acknowledged that all of her questions had been satisfactorily 
answered, the risks had been provided to her, and that she accepted 
"the risk of substantial and serious harm, if any, in hopes of 
obtaining desired beneficial results of such care." (R.787,P.71) 
M. After the surgery, Plaintiff did not express any dissatisfaction with 
the surgery for several months. (R.787,P.72) When she expressed 
some dissatisfaction with her smile, Dr. Johnson and Dr. Walker 
referred plaintiff to a speech pathologist, to whom she went to on 
only one occasion. (R.787,P.74) 
N. Plaintiff then wanted to undergo a lip lift surgery and Dr. Walker 
provided her information about the procedure. (R.787,P.77) She 
studied the materials and asked Dr. Walker and Dr. Johnson 
questions about the procedure. (R.787,P.77) She told them that she 
understood the risks and the options but wanted the lip lift surgery 
done. (R.787,P.77) Dr. Walker informed her that the lip lift surgery 
could change her appearance and that he could not predict exactly 
how it would change her appearance. (R.787,P.79) Plaintiff does not 
dispute Dr. Johnson's note that following the lip lift surgery, she was 
happy with her appearance. (R.787,P.80) 
O. Plaintiff stated that no one should render any opinions about whether 
malpractice occurred without knowing all of the information and 
admitted that her own expert, Dr. Guernsey, did not even know that 
plaintiff had gone to Dr. Cannon for a second opinion prior to the 
surgery. (R.787,PP.86-87) 
P. Dr. Walker took appropriate care of her crossbite and missing molar 
problems. (R.787,P.150) She said that she is currently happy with 
her appearance and smile. (R.785,P.187) 
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Defendant's oral surgery expert Dr. Joseph Van Sickels, testified in part: 
A. He is a board certified oral and maxillofacial surgeon and full 
professor at the University of Texas Health Sciences Center. 
(R.786,PP.7-8) He has written over 100 publications, primarily 
discussing jaw surgery. (R.786,P.9) He has lectured around the 
world on the particular aspect of oral maxillofacial surgery involved 
in this case (R.786JP.71), and he performs about forty to fifty of 
these types of surgeries a year. (R.786,P. 105) 
B. Based upon Dr. Van Sickels' qualifications, education, training, and 
experience, Dr. Walker was well within the standard of care in his 
treatment of plaintiff and followed a conservative approach. 
(R.786,PP.l 1-14,21-22,31-32,39) 
C. Dr. Walker appropriately disclosed to plaintiff what she needed to 
know about his treatment and complied with his professional 
standards in that regard. (R.786,P.22) 
D. Had Dr. Walker been advised by plaintiff of her extensive 
psychiatric history, he could have inquired further to find out 
whether she was stable enough to undergo surgery as this type of 
surgery can change the patient's appearance. Dr. Walker did not 
have this opportunity. (R.786,P.24) 
E. Plaintiffs subsequent surgery with Dr. Wolford essentially restored 
plaintiff back to the position that she had earlier disliked and for 
which she had sought treatment by Dr. Walker. (R.786,P.46) 
Plaintiffs bite, or occlusion, was worse after Dr. Wolford's surgery 
than it was after Dr. Walker's surgery. (R.786,PP.46-47) Dr. 
Wolford also performed a cosmetic nose surgery on plaintiff that was 
unrelated to Dr. Walker's procedure. (R.786,PP.50-51) 
Dr. Robert Birch, one of plaintiff s prior psychiatrists, testified: 
A. He first saw plaintiff in 1992 after she was admitted for threats of 
suicide. (R.786,P.136,140) Plaintiff was depressed and had a 
history of non-compliance with medications and the use of several 
medications. (R.786,P.145) Her diagnosis included bipolar affective 
disorder and anxiety disorder. (R.786,P.145) She had a tendency to 
want to direct her own treatment. (R.786,PP. 146-47) 
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B. Plaintiffs bipolar disorder is characterized by significant mood 
swings. (R.786,P.147) Plaintiff had a long history of therapy and 
medication beginning at the age of twenty-one. (R.786,P.147) She 
was unwilling the accept her diagnosis, was a difficult patient to 
work with initially, and was very concerned about her appearance. 
(R.786,P.146,150) A person in this condition views their appearance 
much more personally than the average individual and may, for 
instance, dress up to do yardwork. (R.786,P.152) She believed she 
was ugly, even though Dr. Birch found her to be the opposite. 
(R.786,PP.152-53) 
C. Under these circumstances, Dr. Birch would recommend a great deal 
of caution before such an individual underwent surgery that would 
alter her appearance. (R.786,P. 153) With these types of personality 
disorders, plaintiff would see everything as being very perfect or 
totally disastrous, with nothing in between. (R.786,P.153) He stated 
that even if she were to become happy with her face, she may well 
pick another area of her body or her face because of her inability to 
accept herself as she is and being unable to live with it. 
(R.786,P.157) 
10. Dr. Ken Baldwin testified that he is an oral and maxillofacial surgeon. 
(R.786,P.178) At plaintiffs request, he examined her after Dr. Walker's surgery and 
came to the conclusion that she had unrealistic expectations as to what results she could 
obtain. (R.786,P. 184). He agreed that simply because a patient is not entirely happy with 
a result does not constitute malpractice. (R.786,P.188) 
11. Dr. Grant Cannon testified: 
A. He is an oral and maxillofacial surgeon with a medical degree and 
board certification as an oral surgeon. (R.786,PP.204-05) 
B. He saw plaintiff before Dr. Walker did any surgery to offer a second 
opinion on the advisability of the surgery. (R.786,PP.201-03) She 
affirmatively stated to Dr. Cannon that she had not had any 
psychiatric or psychological care. (R.786,P.202) 
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C. He noted that Plaintiffs upper jaw was too far forward. 
(R.786,P.204) He concurred with the treatment plan that Dr. 
Walker advised. (R.786,P.204) In other words, he felt that it was 
within reason for this particular patient to have the operation 
proposed by Dr. Walker. (R.786,P.204) Specifically, Dr. Cannon 
diagnosed plaintiff with major anomalies of jaw size. (R.786,P.207) 
D. Some time after Dr. Walker's surgery, plaintiff became unhappy 
with her appearance and once again saw Dr. Cannon. (R.786,P.207) 
Dr. Cannon noted that following Dr. Walker's surgery, plaintiffs 
bite fit together very well. (R.786,P.208) He advised her that further 
surgery would change her good bite and have a fifty percent relapse 
(returning to its original position) potential. (R.786,P.214) Dr. 
Cannon believed that plaintiff probably could not get the result that 
she was looking for, and therefore did not believe she should have a 
third surgery. (R.786,P.215) 
Defendant's psychological expert Dr. David Weight testified: 
A. He saw plaintiff for an independent psychological evaluation. 
(R.787,P.10-13) 
B. Based upon his experience, education, and training, Dr. Weight 
believes that plaintiff suffers from bipolar disorder, meaning the 
patient goes from extreme lows to extreme highs. (R.787,P.14) 
One with this condition can easily get very angry, is often 
demanding and critical, and focuses on appearance. Plaintiff had 
received extensive treatment for this condition. Such a person often 
changes doctors and medications multiple times. (R.787,P. 15) 
C. Plaintiff also had borderline personality features in which the person 
often reports that they have been treated unfairly. (R.787,P.16) Such 
persons get angry quickly and become vindictive and resentful when 
things do not go their way. This condition is contrasted with other 
periods when the person is in deep depression and has a self-hate and 
is critical of her appearance. (R.787,P.18) Such a person feels a need 
to be free of flaws. (R.787,P.26) These individuals also feel that 
they are entitled to things—that anything bad that happens to them 
must have been caused by someone. (R.787,P.29) 
Dr. Ann Fredstrom, plaintiffs current treating psychiatrist, testified that 
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plaintiff is constantly concerned about her appearance, "it's like an underlying theme." 
(R.787,P.199) Plaintiff told her that she had feelings of never being accepted and had at 
times taken herself off medications without a physician's advice. (R.787,P.213-15) 
B, Facts Relevant to Dr. Wolford's Subsequent Care 
14. When plaintiff filed her designation of witnesses prior to trial, she included 
Dr. Larry M. Wolford, M.D., a Texas oral surgeon who treated plaintiff following Dr. 
Walker and performed the third surgery Drs. Walker and Cannon had recommended 
against. (R.156) 
15. Defense counsel had difficulty scheduling the deposition of Dr. Wolford. 
The Court noted in a scheduling conference that it "will consider argument regarding . . . 
a request of defense counsel that Dr. Wolford may not be allowed to testify unless he 
agrees to travel to Salt Lake City for trial." (R.161) 
16. On May 1, 1996, plaintiffs counsel filed a certificate of readiness for trial. 
(R.172) Both defendants filed an objection to plaintiffs certificate of readiness. (R.74-
77) Dr. Walker's counsel noted that he unsuccessfully "has been attempting to obtain 
depositions of the plaintiffs experts for many months." (R.176) 
17. The Court entered an order extending the discovery deadline in the case to 
September 30, 1996. (R.182) 
18. On September 6, 1996, plaintiff filed a "Motion for Deposition by 
Telephone" of Dr. Larry M. Wolford of Dallas, Texas. (R.241) The Court heard oral 
argument on this motion on September 17, 1996, and ruled: 
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Plaintiffs motion for deposition by telephone of Dr. Larry Wolford is 
denied. Before Dr. Wolford's deposition may be taken, plaintiff must 
produce Dr. Wolford's records. If plaintiff cannot otherwise obtain the 
records, this court will issue an order which plaintiff may seek to enforce in 
Texas to obtain the records. After Dr. Wolford's records are produced, his 
deposition may be taken, but not by telephone. The Court reserved ruling 
on whether Dr. Wolford's deposition can be used at trial. . . (R.257-58) 
19. The Court set a ten day jury trial to commence on April 3, 1997. (R.303) 
20. On February 6, 1997, plaintiffs counsel again filed a motion for a 
telephonic deposition for Dr. Larry Wolford. (R.310) The defendants jointly opposed the 
motion stating that the Court had already ruled that Dr. Wolford could not be deposed by 
telephone and that Dr. Wolford could not be deposed until he produced all of his records. 
Defense counsel noted that (1) trial was at that point less than sixty days away, (2) 
plaintiff had filed her Complaint some four years earlier, and (3) despite plaintiffs 
indication that Dr. Wolford would be testifying as an expert in this case (R.332), and 
defendants' numerous requests to obtain his full records and depose him (R.333-36,340-
44), plaintiff continued to refuse to produce Dr. Wolford's records or permit him to be 
deposed in person. 
21. Plaintiffs counsel represented that he was "still working on getting 
additional records from Dr. Wolford." (R.347) 
22. Defense counsel jointly requested an order from the Court that because Dr. 
Wolford refused to produce his records or to travel to Salt Lake City for deposition or 
trial, Dr. Wolford should be barred as a witness at trial. Defense counsel noted that 
plaintiff had already designated another oral surgery expert and an expert orthodontist 
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whose deposition had already been taken. (R.320-31) Alternatively, defense counsel 
again asked the Court to uphold its prior order stating that Dr. Wolford must first produce 
all of his record before the deposition be taken. (R.326-27,361) 
23. After oral argument, the Court issued an order which held in part that Dr. 
Wolford's deposition could be taken by March 14, 1997, and that Dr. Wolford would not 
be allowed to testify at trial unless he travels to Utah to do so. (R.371-72) Plaintiff then 
chose not to depose Dr. Wolford and he did not testify at trial. 
24. In plaintiffs counsel's opening argument, he explained that following Dr. 
Walker's care, plaintiff sought help for her facial deformity from Larry Wolford, M.D. in 
Dallas, Texas. He referred to Dr. Wolford as a nationally known and recognized oral 
surgeon. He explained: 
[Plaintiff] went down [to Texas] and was examined by Dr. Wolford. And 
he, unlike Dr. Walker, did an immediate initial, thorough examination, 
looked at all the alternatives, wrote up a plan with three options of the kind 
of surgery to do, but all basically moving the [Plaintiffs] jaw back to its 
original position before Dr. Walker had operated on her. He told Dottie 
[plaintiff] she needed to have it done. . . She finally had the corrective 
surgery in April 1996 (R.783P.102) (emphasis added) 
25. When Plaintiff questioned Alan Jensen, a subsequent treating orthodontist, 
plaintiffs counsel asked Dr. Jensen whether Dr. Wolford had told Dr. Jensen what Dr. 
Wolford thought about plaintiff. (R.783,P.129) Dr. Walker's counsel objected. The court 
overruled Dr. Walker's objection and permitted Dr. Jensen to testify regarding his 
conversations with Dr. Wolford. (R.783JU30) 
26. Plaintiffs counsel offered correspondence from Dr. Wolford's office 
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regarding his initial examination and what he felt Plaintiff needed. (R.783,P.136) Over 
Defendant's objection. Dr. Jensen was permitted to testify that he and Dr. Wolford felt 
that surgery was necessary in order to correct the condition Plaintiff was in when he first 
saw her. (R.784,P.38-39) 
27. Plaintiffs counsel attempted to redact a handwritten note from an exhibit 
which indicated that Dr. Wolford had a "lack of support" for plaintiffs case. 
(R.783JP.111) Dr. Walker's counsel argued that the notation should go before the jury: 
It's the defendant's position that Dr. Wolford is not supportive of this case, 
did not want to do this surgery. . . . [Plaintiff and her counsel] have made 
representations that Dr. Wolford did the surgery, that it could be done, that 
he was willing to do this. This [hand-written note] shows that he was less 
than willing, and . . . by inference shows that he had no criticism [of Dr. 
Walker's earlier treatment]." (R.783JP.113) 
28. The Court ruled: 
My problem is, Mr. Jensen,. . . Dr. Wolford has, through the course of this 
whole litigation, been notoriously uncooperative. He has not provided 
documents, we've had motions to compel, we've had arguments, we have 
ongoing problems with Dr. Wolford about his deposition being taken, about 
his willingness to cooperate. 
Now, I don't know what picture ultimately is going to be painted of Dr. 
Wolford in his absence, because he is not going to come here and testify. 
So if Dr. Wolford is not coming here to testify, and in part his reason for not 
doing so is that he does not support the theory and the claim, even though 
he did much of the repair surgery that is now going to be told to this jury, 
then I have some reservations as to whether we are going to get the whole 
truth presented to the jury. 
So I'm going to require that this portion of the note regarding the conversation 
with Mr. Jensen be redacted from the documents at this time. If it becomes 
apparent to me that some message is being told to the jury as to Dr. Wolford's 
performance of the surgery, that this note may relate to and be relevant to that, I 
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will reserve determining whether to admit it at that time in rebuttal. (PP. 116-17) 
29. Dr. Walker's counsel expressed the following concern: 
In the closing argument there will be an inference by the plaintiff, as there 
already has been in this case, that Dr. Wolford was supportive of this case. 
Look how easy it was for him to say, look how willing he was to fix it, and 
by inference, how critical he must have been of her [earlier] results, because 
of course he'd not have done the surgery if it did not need to be done, if 
there had not been malpractice. This goes directly to that. (R.783,P. 118) 
30. Without objection from plaintiff, Dr. Walker's counsel asked Dr. Jensen 
(R.784,P.180), Dr. Wright (R.784,PP. 225-26), Dr. Guernsey (R.785,P.95), and plaintiff 
(R.787,P.96) whether Dr. Wolford had expressed any criticism of Dr. Walker. Each 
stated that Dr. Wolford had not. 
31. Prior to Dr. Walker's testimony, counsel for Dr. Walker presented to the 
Court a bench brief and a copy of a Utah Supreme Court decision related to a defendant 
being entitled to testify as an expert in his own case and the exception associated with the 
medical expert testifying as to hearsay. (R.785,P.193) Dr. Walker's counsel stated that 
he was raising these issues early instead of when Dr. Walker was on the stand. Plaintiff 
stipulated and the District Court ruled that Dr. Walker could testify as an expert in his 
own field. (R.785,P.194) 
32. During Dr. Walker's examination, the following conversation occurred 
regarding Dr. Wolford: 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Any other doctors you've heard from about this case and in your care? 
Yes. I heard from Dr. Wolford. 
Did he call you? 
He called me. 
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Q: Did he give you information upon which one in your profession would 
reasonably and customarily rely m forming opinions about the care that was 
rendered in this case*? 
A: Yes, he did. 
Q: What did he tell you? 
Mr. Jensen: Your Honor, I object on the grounds that this is not related to care and 
this is new information not previously disclosed. 
Mr. Rencher: [Rule of Evidence] 703, the Schreider case and the admission by Mr. 
Jensen two days ago that this witness can testify as an expert your Honor. 
The Court: You mean 703 or 803? 
Mr. Jensen: It was cited together with 803 m the Schreider case "An expert may 
testify as to hearsay comments, as long as they are reasonably and customarily 
relied upon." 
The Court: What you are saying is that this fact witness is also an expert witness? 
Mr. Rencher: By stipulation from Mr. Jensen two days ago, after presenting my 
bench brief, yes, your Honor. 
The Court: Alright. Based on the Court's reading of 703 and 803 (4) the 
objection is overruled. I will allow the answer to stand, or to be given. 
Q: (By Mr. Rencher) What did Dr. Wolford tell you when he called you? 
A: Dr. Wolford called me on the phone after he had received notice that he was 
probably going to have his deposition taken m this case. Which was in 
March of this year. And I was kind of surprised, actually, to see that he had 
called me, because to this point I had not talked to Dr. Wolford at all about 
this case. 
Q: Had you ever met him? 
A No. 
Q: Go ahead. 
A: And what he told me was - - is that he - - first of all, he wanted to know some 
other information about this case, especially if he was going to have his 
deposition taken. And so at that point I said to him, Did you realize that 
this patient, when she came to me, complained of bimaxillary protrusion of 
having the facial appearance "like a monkey" and she had six millimeters of 
overjet between the anterior maxilla and mandibular teeth? And he said no 
He said "I told Dottie Schmidt when she came to see me that there had not 
been malpractice on my part or any of the care that was previously - - she 
had previously received, as far as her orthodontic and surgical care." . . 
He said "To my knowledge, and what I see of your records and x-rays . . 
there has not been malpractice committed here." He said "Dr. Walker did 
one thing, and I did something else, and I did this based on what the patient 
requested and his treatment was different than mine Based on two different 
problems" (R.787,P.249-52) 
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33. The next day, plaintiff objected to this testimony, Defense counsel 
responded: 
Dr. Guernsey testified that he himself called Dr. Wolford. . . . [I]t isn't fair to say 
that Dr. Guernsey can call Dr. Wolford and testify [what] he learned . . . and not 
allow Dr. Walker to answer the telephone if Dr. Wolford calls. 
Finally, there was a stipulation that Dr. Walker would be an expert witness. 
I provided the Court and counsel to the very citation, State vs. Schreuder, 
that analyzed the very exception which the Court properly allowed in the 
case to allow the hearsay exception, based upon the foundation that was 
reasonably and customarily relied upon by an expert who is going to 
address it (R.788,PP.5-6) 
34. The Court responded: 
...The Court finds that the motion for a mistrial should be and the same is 
hereby denied. In addition, the Court finds that the evidence referred to was 
properly received under Rule 703, and as applied under the other rules 
related to 803, 804 on hearsay. 
There is no secret about the performed surgery that was conducted by Dr. 
Wolford. The plaintiff has had every opportunity or right to bring Dr. Wolford 
here to testify. He could have testified as to all the circumstances of this case. 
The evidence has been massive as to . . . the bill that she's incurred, 
the follow-up therapy and treatment that she encountered in relation to Dr. 
Wolford's treatment. Then it would be inequitable to allow Dr. Guernsey to 
refer to it, who was the plaintiffs expert, without allowing others to have 
reasonable conversations with him to also be referred to. 
. . . We are just going to simply look at the record to see if that was made clear to 
me at the time that Dr. Walker rendered the testimony. Because I don't remember 
[Rule 703] being the aspect of [plaintiff s] objection. I do remember concern 
about Dr. Wolford's testimony through Dr. Walker. 
(R.788,PP.6-7). 
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35. Defendant's counsel added the following: 
If you will recall, Dr. Guernsey did the same thing. He was shown articles that are 
clearly hearsay, upon which there was no foundation made as to who the 
publishers were - - excuse me, who the writers were, what clinical studies they had 
relied upon, what basis in the medicine that had for their opinions. 
And [plaintiffs counsel] and Dr. Guernsey read them, and the jury presumably 
could rely upon these on foundation-laid documents that Dr. Guernsey relied on. 
The only difference is, mine was an oral opinion after I did lay the 
foundation. I laid the foundation required by 703 to get in a publication or 
an oral opinion. "Doctor, is that something you would reasonably rely upon 
as an expert in your field?" 
If [plaintiffs counsel] wanted to voir dire him, he had an opportunity to 
contest the foundation. He did not object to the foundation, as I recall it. 
So to now give a suggestion and instruction that we disregard, because - -
without telling the jury the foundation was inadequate - - takes away from 
Mr. Jensen's burden to object to the foundation. (R.788,PP.10-11) 
C. Facts Related to the Insurance Pre-Authorization Document 
36. Prior to the trial commencing, the District Court heard argument on certain 
insurance issues. Counsel for Dr. Walker brought the following to the Court's attention: 
Mr. Jensen [counsel for plaintiff] has requested that no information 
regarding insurance be considered or heard by the jury. While I believe 
that's appropriate as to the malpractice insurance, I think it is problematic 
and inappropriate to other references to insurance in this regard . . . . 
The . . . insurance issue is directly relevant to Dr. Walker's defense. He has 
claimed and will claim that one of the reasons that he did his surgery . . . was 
because of the limitation of insurance that the plaintiff had, and her urgency that it 
be done quickly, because her insurance was running out through her COBRA 
payments. 
So we believe that we'll be entitled to argue that the timing of the surgery . . . 
was all appropriate as a result of her claims of urgency for insurance purposes. 
(R.783,P.10-12) 
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37. The Court ruled in part: 
[A]s to the motion regarding the urgency of the surgery that she claimed she 
needed because of the loss of her COBRA coverage. The motion in limine 
is granted in that respect, that I don't think that the loss of COBRA 
coverage is relevant further. (R.783P.14-16) 
38. However, during a break in the trial, there was a discussion as to the 
redacting of insurance information from a pre-authorization document. (R.783,P.108) 
The Court stated the following: 
I will tell you that it is beginning to appear to me that this insurance issue is 
something that maybe I'm going to change my mind on telling the jury 
about. Because if [plaintiff s] pressing [Dr. Walker] to hurry up the surgery 
because of her claim of no coverage then that could cause them to make 
decisions in advance of what they normally would have otherwise. 
(R.783,P.108) 
39. The following exchange took place between plaintiffs own counsel and 
defendant's oral surgery expert, Dr. Van Sickels. 
Mr. Jensen: [Dr. Walker] wrote [plaintiff] an authorization for [an osteotomy] 
surgery shortly after he saw her in September 1988, talking about a le forte 
osteotomy did he not? (R.786,PP.86-87) 
Dr. Van Sickels: As I understand it, he saw the patient, presented her with 
several options, one of which was surgery. Surgery was an option. And 
surgery involved, of course, getting her to a hospital, which would involve 
insurance coverage. So he wrote to see if that was a viable option to 
pursue. (R.786,P.87) 
Mr. Jensen: He got authorization - - he requested authorization to do an 
osteotomy, and that request was in November 1988, following his first 
assessment of her in September? 
Dr. Van Sickels: Often times we see patients who present to us with complaints. 
We look and see what the treatment plans involve, one of which may involve 
surgery. Now, since there is a question of third-party coverage too. . . . You are 
going to send them a letter. If there is no coverage, then that's not an option at all. 
The Court: Let me caution you, Doctor, that what we're dealing with here is the 
surgical aspect, not the financial aspects. So please do not refer to anything that 
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might be a financial option for coverage . . . (R.786,P.87) 
40. Dr. Walker's counsel rendered the following objection: 
I believe . . . Mr. Jensen opened the door on the insurance issue through a 
witness. . . . And I asked the Court for an opportunity, since the door had 
been opened by Mr. Jensen, who followed up on this pre-authorization 
letter, to likewise address it. My understanding from the bench was that 
that was denied, and I wanted to preserve that objection. (R.787,P.l 14) 
41. Regarding this objection, the following discussion took place: 
The Court: There has been an objection by [plaintiff] regarding any 
reference to the insurance coverage that she had. In conversations at the 
sidebar and/or in motions earlier to be considered by the Court came, it 
became apparent to me that the time she was being provided care by Drs. 
Johnson and Walker, that she was also running near the end of her COBRA 
coverage which was available to her following or during the period of her 
divorce from her first husband, Mr. Larsen. 
Mr. Jensen: I assume that's true too. 
The Court: In the insurance coverage that she was provided with, that COBRA 
coverage, [plaintiff] had objected to there being any reference at all to the 
insurance coverage. And it's your objection and it's a long-standing policy 
of the Court's not to allow the issue of insurance to be considered, certainly 
as it may apply to damages or affect damages, if someone were to believe 
an insurance company - - or that one is insured, and thus going for a deeper 
pocket for damages. That is the real theory behind all of this. 
Now we have got a question here whether she had a motive to get her 
surgery done earlier by Dr. Walker then he otherwise would have done, if it 
weren't for that motive. 
Now, if you are claiming that he did not adequately prepare, did not adequately 
determine the need for the surgery, it seems to me that the issue of motive on her 
part is relevant, and that the insurance issue should be considered. 
[Plaintiff] has COBRA coverage that lasts another two months. We want you to 
do that surgery. . . . [T]hat's the very reason that she applied for advance approval, 
to see if they could get coverage for it. She wouldn't have had the surgery if she 
didn't have the coverage. So she is motivated in that respect. 
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The insurance is not being raised for the proposition of "who has the deepest 
pocket and can answer in damage." It's being raised to illustrate the motivation of 
the parties. And the party is the plaintiff. It's not motivation of the physician. 
. . . Well, to me this issue of insurance that motivated the performing of the surgery 
also gave motivation to the plaintiff to be anxious to want to get it done. 
. . . [Ijnsurance is only brought up in this case to illustrate - - to show that she 
can't afford to pay for it. She would not have been able to pay for the surgery if 
she were paying for it out of her own pocket. 
Mr. Jensen: We'll admit that. 
The Court: Okay. So the financial motivation for her is, my opportunity or 
window for me to pay for the surgery while covered by the COBRA coverage. If 
that terminates, which it does at a certain point here, then I am not going to have it 
paid for. Therefore, I am going to go to my physicians and tell them I want this 
done. . . . Well, this whole area gives me serious trouble. 
(R.787,PP.l 19-28) 
42. Defendant's counsel further commented on the insurance issue: 
Mr. Rencher: Dr. Walker will testify that [he] understands that insurance 
companies use doctors to evaluate whether the care is necessary. . . . I 
should be able to ask [Dr. Walker], it's your understanding, having done 
this, there would have been someone in your specialty, and they would have 
to say surgery was indicated. That's another reason the insurance needs to 
come in. 
. . . Dr. Walker will address how he, as part of his work, evaluates the 
reasonableness of other surgery based upon preauthorizations similar to what he 
submitted. He's not going to testify he knows this was reviewed. But that 
demonstrates the credibility of his own decision in this case that the surgery was 
reasonable, having been in the position of judging other's surgeon's care through 
the use of preauthorization letters, such as what he sent in this case. 
(R.787,PP.131-33) 
43. The Court ruled as follows: 
I am going to continue with this prior ruling that I have made with respect 
to the insurance issue that it will not be disclosed in detail. I have already 
expressed on the record my frustration, but I will allow you to continue to 
deal with the issue as you have, that financial motivations were encouraging 
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her, frankly - - or to get surgery done. And I would just say to you that it 
doesn't take much to determine that financial consideration are probably 
insurance, so I suspect the jury could do that. . . I do think there is reason 
for some serious second thoughts about it, and I have expressed them on the 
record, but that's the ruling. (R.787,PP. 133-34) 
44. During Dr. Walker's testimony, the following conversation occurred 
regarding the insurance pre-authorization letter Dr. Walker had written: 
Q: Tell me, in 1990 did [Plaintiff] present with financial considerations 
requesting you to do the surgery as soon as possible? 
A: Yes, she did. 
Q: Did you view her as having any motivation to go pursue the surgery as soon 
as possible based upon the financial considerations? 
A: That was one of the - - one consideration. 
Q: In fact, did it appear to you that, but for the financial considerations, she may 
not have had the surgery? 
A: Correct. (R.787,PP.255-56) 
45. Plaintiffs counsel proceeded to repeatedly ask Dr. Walker why he had 
written the pre-authorization letter to address Plaintiffs monkey-like appearance with 
surgery [although Dr. Walker had been instructed by the Court that he could not talk 
about insurance]: 
Q: [By plaintiffs counsel] Why would, within sixty days or less, did your office 
receive a phone call asking for the surgery to be scheduled, to be planned, 
to be authorized? 
A: Dottie Schmidt requested that. 
Q: That's right. How could you respond, without seeing her again, with the 
request for authorization to do the surgery you did two years later? 
A: Because if we - -1 did that at her request. I did that letter at her request. 
Because she wanted to know if she's going to have the money available to 
do it or not to do it. 
Q: You couldn't ask for authorization to do the surgery unless in your mind you 
had a treatment plan and a program to do that surgery, could you? . . Did 
you just say, "I'm going to do the surgery and I don't know why or what 
for?" 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I didn't. 
You had to know that was your plan to do surgery, then and there? 
No, it wasn't. 
Are you being entirely candid with me? 
I am being totally candid. If that were the case, Mr. Jensen, I would have said, 
"Okay. Fine, Dottie. When would you want to get it scheduled?" 
(R.787JPP.284-85) 
Q: What was your treatment plan when you wrote for surgery authorization? 
A: I only did that at Dottie Schmidt's request, to find out if there was financially • 
- if we could, if we had to, at some point proceed with this but I did not tell 
her that that was what we were going to do at that time. 
Q: You didn't? 
A: I told her it was a possibility we were going to do it. 
Q: Then she calls you and says, "Please get the authorization to do the surgery?" 
A: Yes. 
Q: Does that make sense? 
A: It makes total sense. That's what usually happens. 
Q: That she would make the decision to have surgery? 
A: No. 
Q: And you would request it and she is responsible for that decision? 
A: No. What she wanted to know was, from a financial consideration, with 
surgery, if it had to be done, would it be possible, and, you know, what I'm 
talking about. (R.787,PP.287-88) 
46. When the jury was excused, the Court stated the following: 
Mr. Jensen, [your] motivation, to place upon Dr. Walker the writing of the 
letter in November 1988 to seek authorization as though that is a concluded 
treatment plan presents to me the view that is an improper perspective. 
And on that basis, I am going to allow cross-examination of that, and 
disclosure of the purpose that's being motivated by the plaintiff. . . . The 
issue was insurance, but when a party comes to a physician after one visit, 
and then two months later and requests that authorization "because my 
insurance is going to run out," that is not motivated by the physician, that's 
motivated by the patient. 
And the extent to which [plaintiffs] examination [of Dr. Walker] has gone 
to try to conclude that as though it were the determined course of treatment 
creates the potential, in my judgment, for an inadequate conclusion by the 
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jury. An thus, I will allow [testimony regarding the insurance pre-
authorization]. 
[Plaintiff] contacted Dr. Walker in November, and it was she who was 
precipitating some further surgery at that point. And to cause this jury to 
infer that it was he who was motivated that because he had a fixed plan, is 
inaccurate. 
Mr. Jensen: Who is going to decide that your Honor? 
The Court: The jury will. It's a fact question for them to decide. But what I'm 
saying to you, I'm going to allow the presentation of that evidence because of the 
nature of [plaintiffs] examination. (R.787,PP.291-93) 
47. Plaintiffs counsel continued to ask Dr. Walker when he determined to do 
surgery. Dr. Walker continued to respond that after his first visit with plaintiff in 
September 1988, surgery was a possibility, but only if plaintiff continued to fail in 
orthodontic treatment. (R.788,PP. 17-18) The following conversation took place: 
Q: You had formulated the plan [in September 1988] to do surgery to take care of 
this protrusiveness? 
A: That's not correct. Because there was still a possibility that it could be 
corrected with orthodontic treatment. 
Q: You wrote a letter to this effect - - well to this effect, and it's in Exhibit D-69. 
"The patient was referred to me by her orthodontist - - that's Dr. Johnson - -
because of gross facial/skeletal deformity." Now you'd seen her by that 
time? 
A: Yes I had seen her one time, yes. (R.788,P.18) 
48. Plaintiffs counsel continued to cross-examine Dr. Walker on why he 
wrote the pre-authorization letter. The following discussion then arose: 
The Court: . . . [Plaintiffs counsel was] the one that brought this up. . . . [T]he 
letter was motivated because she had a belief that her insurance coverage was 
going to terminate at a certain time. And that termination caused her to want to be 
sure that this condition would be covered under the insurance policy. . . . But the 
letter was motivated for the purpose of obtaining a prior approval from the 
insurance company. . . . The motivation of the parties may remain a fact in 
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dispute. I will let you deal with that. You can deal with that through the 
witnesses. 
Nevertheless, [plaintiff] asked [Dr. Walker], after the one visit with him in 
September - - in November she asked him to write the letter to get prior 
approval for that surgery, and that letter was to her insurance company. 
(R.788,PP.20-22) 
49. Further discussion occurred outside of the presence of the jury: 
The Court: I have ruled throughout the entirety of this case that you may not refer 
to the insurance as it would apply to the circumstances of this case. And all 
throughout the case everybody has been referring to financial considerations, and 
financial compunctions. 
Now [plaintiffs counsel is] the one that has chosen to go through this 
examination and create a picture as to the motivation . . . under the theory of 
the ruling that I will not allow anything to refer to insurance coverage - -
and [plaintiff] want[s] to make this appear as though the doctor was 
motivated to do this independently. 
The evidence doesn't sustain that. The doctor was contacted in his office, on time 
by the plaintiff, before the letter was asked to be sent. He was asked to send the 
letter at the time, when . . . according to his own testimony, he had anticipated she 
was returning to orthodontic care and that she could have had this result solely by 
orthodontic care. 
Now, he didn't precipitate the contact from her. She did it because she 
knew that she may not be able to pay for this surgery if she wanted it to be 
done, unless she asked for it within the COBRA protection period. And 
that becomes a factor that, by [plaintiffs] examination of [Dr. Walker], and 
[plaintiffs] method of examination of the witness has become a relevant 
fact in this case. 
I cannot allow a witness to sit on the stand and be required to - - she had 
financial motivations. He had no motivation whatsoever to write the letter, 
were it not for her request. 
Mr. Jensen: . . . [T]here is no evidence of COBRA for this issue in this case. . . . 
The Court: There has been no evidence because I have disallowed it. There's 
multiple conversations with counsel all the way along, motions in limine, motions 
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to avoid approaching this discussion. That has been replete from the beginning of 
this case. 
The defendant's attorney has requested that they be allowed to 
talk about these things. I have denied those requests all the way along 
until [plaintiff] wantfs] to create the appearance to the jury that this 
letter is somehow motivated because this doctor had concluded that 
that was the course of treatment... And [plaintiff] want[s] to present 
that to the jury without letting the Doctor testify at all about what his 
real motivation was and who precipitated it. That is inequitable to the 
Doctor, and I won't allow it. (R.788,PP.23-25) 
50. After the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the following 
conversation took place: 
Mr. Jensen: I've asked the Court to instruct the jury that the Court's comments 
about what the evidence is and the motivation of Dr. Walker was inappropriate. 
The Court: That's fine. I'll do that. 
Mr. Jensen: And that that is not given at all. 
The Court: Following discussion with counsel, I want to clarify the instruction that 
I gave you regarding this letter. The motivation to send the letter is something that 
you must establish from hearing the testimony of the witness. So ignore my 
comment as to what the motivation and objective was in sending the letter until 
you've heard that evidence from the witness. (R.788,PP.26-27) 
51. Plaintiffs counsel again continued to repeatedly cross-exam Dr. Walker on 
the contents of the "letter to the insurance company." (R.788,PP.29-33,42-47) 
Plaintiffs counsel accused Dr. Walker of making a false statement in the document. 
(R.788,P.99) Dr. Walker responded: 
This letter was written at the request of Dottie Schmidt. I did not solicit this 
letter. She solicited this letter from my office. She called my office 
manager and said, "Would you please write a letter to my insurance 
company for possible authorization of health benefits for insurance 
coverage if I'm going to have an osteotomy [jaw surgery]. I don't know if 
I'm going to have it now, or not. Dr. Walker hasn't said I am going to have 
it. But I want to know if my insurance will cover this or if it won't cover it 
because two reasons: Number one I don't have the money to pay for this out 
- 3 3 
of my own pocket, and I don't have insurance coverage. And number two, 
my insurance coverage is running out. I have some sort of a COBRA plan, 
so I have to pay every month for the insurance and it's eventually going to 
run out, so I want to know up front, is the insurance possibly going to cover 
this, or is it not going to cover it. 
And that was the motivation, and the letter was sent, and it was done at 
Dottie Schmidt's request. (R.788,P.40) 
That letter was written for insurance coverage, Mr. Jensen, and things change. 
And if we had heard back from the insurance that no, there is no coverage, then we 
wouldn't consider a Le Forte I Osteotomy because there are no insurance benefits. 
(R.788,P.45) 
52. The parties to the action rested and the Judge gave fifty-three instructions to 
the jury. (R.788,PP.626-80) These included instructions that: 
You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but must 
consider the instructions as a whole. (R.788,P.626) 
This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard 
from the witnesses, and have seen in the form of documents, photographs or 
tangible things admitted into evidence. Anything you have seen or heard 
from any other source may not be considered by you in arriving at your 
verdict. (R.788,P.630) 
It has never been my intention to give any hint that you should return one 
verdict or another in this case. Please understand that I do not wish in any 
way to influence your verdict. It would be improper for me to do so. 
Deciding a proper verdict is exclusively your job. I cannot participate in 
that decision in any way. Please disregard anything that I may have said or 
done if it made you think that I preferred one verdict over another, that I 
believed one witness over another, or that I considered any piece of 
evidence more important than any other. (R.788,P.632) 
You may not find Dr. Walker negligent or at fault merely because he prepared and 
sent a letter at plaintiffs request to her health insurance company to see if her 
insurance would pay for her surgery for Dottie Schmidt's pre-existing dental 
condition before her insurance expired. You also need not conclude that at the 
time he sent the letter at plaintiffs request that he had decided to perform surgery 
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on her. (R.788,P.672, Instruction No. 47) 
53. Plaintiffs entire objection to jury instruction number 47 is as follows: 
"[Plaintiff] takes exception to instruction number 47 on the grounds that this instruction 
injects the issue of insurance in the case, without foundation. And raised an issue that 
was not material or relevant." (R.788,P.99) (emphasis added) 
54. During closing argument, plaintiffs counsel was given broad latitude to 
argue that surgery should not have been performed on plaintiff and that the decision to 
perform surgery was reached early on in her treatment. (R.788,PP.673-75) 
55. The jurors unanimously determined that Dr. Walker was not negligent. 
(R.788,PP.101-102) (Appendix 1) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Following six days of evidence, the jury unanimously concluded that Dr. Walker 
was not negligent in treating plaintiff for her severe oral and facial problems. Plaintiffs 
two asserted errors are without merit. 
The District Court did not abuse its broad discretion by allowing Dr. Walker, a 
stipulated expert, to testify regarding the call he received from plaintiffs post-operative 
oral surgeon, Dr. Wolford. First, plaintiffs counsel's objection did not address Utah R. 
Evid. 703 and thus this issue was not properly preserved for appeal. Second, the 
testimony was properly admitted, especially given the fact that plaintiffs counsel, over 
defendant's objection, was permitted to obtain the same information from other 
witnesses. Finally, any error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence that Dr. 
- 3 ! ? -
Walker complied with his requisite standard of care. 
The District Court properly clarified an insurance pre-authorization issue after 
plaintiff repeatedly created a false impression by unfairly taking advantage of a motion in 
limine barring evidence of insurance. Specifically, plaintiffs counsel vigorously cross-
examined Dr. Walker as to why he had written what he had in a pre-authorization letter to 
plaintiffs insurance company, while Dr. Walker had been instructed by the Court that he 
could not address insurance issues. In any case, following the instruction, the District 
Court gave plaintiffs requested cautionary instruction. Plaintiff has also failed to meet 
her duty to demonstrate that had the instruction not been given, the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. 
Because the complained of acts were proper, or alternatively were harmless, the 
District Court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying plaintiffs motion for a new 
trial and motion for mistrial. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING DR. WALKER, AS A STIPULATED EXPERT, TO TESTIFY 
AS TO THE CALL HE RECEIVED FROM PLAINTIFF'S POST-
OPERATIVE ORAL SURGEON. 
A. Plaintiffs Non-Specific Objection Failed to Preserve This 
Issue for Appeal. 
Plaintiff first appeal issue asserts that Dr. Walker "suddenly" (Aplt Brief at 9) 
stated that he had spoken to Dr. Wolford and that Dr. Wolford had said there had been no 
malpractice. This issue was not properly preserved for appeal and should be rejected by 
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this Court without further review. An objection must state the specific grounds upon 
which it is based. Utah R. Evid. 103. Particular, and not general, objections are required. 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). This rule is especially true here where Dr. 
Walker's counsel notified plaintiff and the Court well in advance that he would be relying 
on Rule 703 and where the parties had already stipulated that Dr. Walker could testify as 
an expert in his own field of specialty. (R.785,PP. 193-94). 
When Dr. Walker explained that Dr. Wolford had called him, and proceeded to 
discuss the conversation (as had plaintiffs own witnesses Dr. Jensen (R.784,P.180), Dr. 
Wright (R.784,PP.225-26), Dr. Guernsey (R.785,P.95), and plaintiff (R.787,P.96)), 
plaintiffs counsel's objection was as follows: "Your Honor, I object on the grounds that 
this is not related to care and this is new information not previously disclosed." 
(R.787,P.251). Dr. Walker's counsel cited to Utah R. Evid. 703 and Dr. Walker's status 
as an expert in his filed. Plaintiffs counsel did not respond to this statement, and the 
Court permitted the testimony under Rule 703. 
Following Dr. Walker's testimony, plaintiffs counsel renewed her objection and 
the Court appropriately stated, "I don't remember an objection to that opinion. We are 
just going to simply look at the record to see if that was made clear to me at the time that 
Dr. Walker rendered the testimony. Because I don't remember that being the aspect of 
your objection." (R.788,P.8). Because Plaintiffs objection did not address rule 703, and 
therefore did not appropriately bring this issue to the Court's attention, the issue was not 
properly preserved on appeal and should be dismissed without further analysis. American 
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Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (issue waived on appeal when not 
raised below). 
B. Alternatively, the Testimony Was Properly Admitted. 
The trial court is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the admissibility of 
expert testimony, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse its decision will not be 
reversed. Lamb v. Bangart 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). Dr. Walker, a board certified oral 
surgeon M.D. with twenty years of experience, was appropriately designated an expert on 
his own behalf. The Court and plaintiff stipulated that he was an expert in his field. 
(R.785,P.194) 
Plaintiff now claims that Dr. Walker was improperly permitted to give hearsay 
testimony as to comments made by Dr. Wolford about Dr. Walker's care and treatment of 
the plaintiff. The District Court properly allowed the testimony. Prior to the testimony 
in question, Dr. Walker provided the Court and counsel with a citation to State v. 
Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986), for an analysis of those rules authorizing an 
expert to testify to hearsay. In Schreuder. the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged, 
among other things, that (a) Rule of Evidence 703 allows expert testimony to be based on 
inadmissible evidentiary facts if they are the kind ordinarily relied upon by experts in the 
field; (b) the Federal evidentiary rules abolished any distinction between a physician 
repeating an out-of-court statement for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of the 
opinion and repeating the statement to prove the truth of the out-of-court declaration; and 
(c) the right to cross-examine the expert (in this case Dr. Walker) reinforces the 
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probability of reliability of allowing an expert to testify as to hearsay. This holding is 
consistent with Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which provides that facts or data 
reasonably relied upon by experts in a particular field and in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject need not be facts that are admissible in evidence. See also 
State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982). 
Dr. Walker asserted his expert opinion at trial that he had acted well within his 
standard of care.2 He based this opinion upon his education, background, training, the 
medical literature, his review of the medical records, the depositions that had been taken, 
and all other materials in regard to the case. He testified that one of the facts he relied on, 
and on which experts in his field rely on, is the impression of "downstream" providers of 
care. Dr. Wolford's lack of criticism for Dr. Walker helped Dr. Walker form his belief 
that no malpractice had occurred. He was entitled as a medical expert under Rule 703 to 
render this opinion and the basis for it. Plaintiff was free to (and did) cross-examine Dr. 
Walker vigorously to try to weaken the assumption on which his opinion was based. 
Bear in mind that it was plaintiff who brought about these events by designating 
Dr. Wolford, then refusing to produce his complete records, submit him to deposition, or 
bring him to trial. Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that it was Dr. Walker who "got Judge 
2It is well recognized that once an appropriate foundation has been laid, a 
defendant physician may testify as an expert on the applicable standard of care in his or 
her own case. Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912 (Utah 1982); Rohe v. Shivde. 560 N.E.2d 
1113,1121 (Ct. App.), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 848 (111. 1990); Shelton v. U.S.A.. 804 
F.Supp. 1147, 1155-56 (E.D. Mo. 1992); Flovd v. Brouehton. 664 So.2d 897, 899 (Ala. 
1995); Evans v. Bernhardt 533 P.2d 721, 724 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975). 
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Young to prohibit him from testifying." (Aplt Brief at 13) Dr. Walker only moved to 
exclude Dr. Wolford when, as trial neared, Dr. Wolford had not produced his records or 
submitted to a requested deposition. (R.320-21). As the above lengthy facts indicate, 
Judge Young ruled just weeks before trial, and despite Dr. Walker's motion, that Dr. 
Wolford could still testify. (R.371-72) Plaintiff refused to produce Dr. Wolford or to 
arrange for him to travel to Utah for trial. 
Interestingly, plaintiff asked both the subsequent treating orthodontist, Dr. Jensen 
(who was not designated as an expert), and his medical expert Dr. Guernsey, over 
Defendant's objection, whether these individuals had spoken to Dr. Wolford and the 
subject of those discussions and Dr. Wolford's treatment. (R.783,P.130) Through these 
statements, and plaintiffs opening statement, the jury was given the distinct impression 
that Dr. Wolford was critical of Dr. Walker's care. The District Court in fact worried 
aloud that with Dr. Wolford's absence and plaintiffs implications of his criticisms, "I 
have some reservations as to whether we are going to get the whole truth presented to the 
jury." (R.783,P.l 16-17). It would obviously be inherently unfair for Plaintiff to have the 
right to allow such testimony in and deny Defendant the same right. 
Based upon plaintiffs own decisions, plaintiffs stipulation that Dr. Walker could 
testify as an expert, and Utah Supreme Court analysis and evidentiary rules, the Court did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Walker to testify as to comments made by Dr. 
Wolford, plaintiffs subsequent treating surgeon. 
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C. Alternatively, Any Error Was Harmless. 
Plaintiff has the duty of showing that the error, if there was one, affected a 
substantial right. Utah R. Evid. 103. To establish reversible error, plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the testimony in question had an substantial bearing on the outcome of 
the trial. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 439 P.2d 279 (Utah 1968). Improper admission of 
hearsay evidence is harmless error were the exclusion of such evidence was not likely to 
produce a different result. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 111 (Utah 1982). 
The jury in this matter heard six days of evidence from over a dozen witnesses, 
most of whom had medical training. Prior to Dr. Walker's testimony, the jury had heard 
from a number of other witnesses that Dr. Wolford was not critical of Dr. Walker's care. 
Indeed, without objection, Dr. Walker's counsel asked Dr. Jensen (R.784,P.180), Dr. 
Wright (R.784,PP. 225-26), Dr. Guernsey (R.785,P.95), and plaintiff (R.787,P.96) 
whether Dr. Wolford had expressed any criticism of Dr. Walker. Each stated that Dr. 
Wolford had not. Dr. Walker's parallel statement did not "tip the scales" where the 
overwhelming and substantial evidence in this case demonstrate that plaintiff was an 
appropriate candidate for Dr. Walker's surgery and had a successful outcome, even 
though many months later she had some cosmetic concerns. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CLARIFIED AN INSURANCE PRE-
AUTHORIZATION ISSUE AFTER PLAINTIFF REPEATEDLY 
CREATED A FALSE IMPRESSION BY UNFAIRLY TAKING 
ADVANTAGE OF A MOTION IN LIMINE BARRING EVIDENCE OF 
INSURANCE. ALTERNATIVELY, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
Plaintiff argues that the Trial Court erred in clarifying an insurance issue that had 
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created a false impression to the jury due to a prior ruling of the Trial Court barring any 
mention of insurance at trial. A trial court is given broad discretion in overseeing the 
evidence that is presented in the courtroom and has a function beyond sitting as a 
comparatively silent monitor of the proceedings. The trial court has a prerogative to 
clarify or explain the evidence as it relates to the disputed issues. Cintron v. Milkovich, 
611 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1980). See also Poulsen v. Frear. 946 P.2d 738 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (trial judge showed no biased in taking active role in how evidence was presented). 
Before the trial began, the Court granted plaintiffs motion in limine to the effect 
that no mention of insurance could be made at trial. Dr. Walker's counsel expressed 
concern because plaintiff had pushed Dr. Walker to obtain authorization and to perform 
the surgery on her time frame due to the fact that her dental insurance coverage was 
terminating. (R.783JPP. 10-12). The Court held firm that no insurance issues could be 
discussed at trial. (R.783,PP14-16) The parties agreed to refer discretely to "financial 
considerations." 
As the trial progressed, plaintiffs counsel, notwithstanding her own motion in 
limine, repeatedly interjected the insurance issue into the trial. The District Court grew 
more and more uncomfortable with plaintiffs counsel's use of the Court's prior ruling to 
criticize the timing of Dr. Walker's recommendation to operate. (R.783,P.108). Dr. 
Walker's counsel objected a number of times to what was occurring, but the Court held 
firm that no there would be no discussion of insurance. (R.787,PP. 133-34). 
The last straw came when plaintiffs counsel vigorously cross-examined Dr. 
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Walker as to why he had written a insurance pre-authorization letter outlining a surgical 
option. All Dr. Walker was permitted to say was that he wrote the letter at plaintiffs 
request to see what options were available. Plaintiffs counsel accused him of being less 
than "candid" in not admitting that the letter contained a firm treatment plan (which Dr. 
Walker denied) and that his answer didn't "make sense." (R.787,PP.287-88) After the 
jury's departure, the Court stated that he would permit cross-examination on the issue and 
that the jury could be told about the true reason the letter had been written. 
Notwithstanding this ruling, plaintiffs counsel continued to try to exploit the 
insurance letter. (R.788,PP.17-18). The Court then appropriate explained to the jury that 
"the letter was motivated because [plaintiff] had a belief that her insurance coverage was 
going to terminate at a certain time." [R.788,PP.20-22]. Outside of the presence of the 
jury, the District Court explained that plaintiffs counsel had throughout the trial unfairly 
used the insurance limitation against Dr. Walker. "[Y]ou want to present that to the jury 
without letting the Doctor testify at all about what his real motivation was and who 
precipitated [the letter]. That is inequitable to the Doctor, and I won't allow it." 
(R.788,PP.25). 
This was not an improper interference with the presentation of evidence. On the 
contrary, the District Court properly determined that one of its rulings was being unfairly 
stretched to present a false impression to the jury (i.e. that the letter, prepared at plaintiffs 
request, demonstrated that Dr. Walker intended to perform surgery at the time the letter 
was written), and the Court felt that the issue needed to be clarified. The District Court 
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ruled outside of the presence of the jury, and only instructed the jury after plaintiffs 
counsel again attempted to present the false impression. The District Court was entirely 
within its discretion to instruct the jury that Dr. Walker's pre-surgical authorization was to 
protect the plaintiffs insurance benefits, a fact the jury had theretofore been barred from 
knowing. 
The instruction was accurate and permissible based upon the fact that plaintiff, 
through her counsel, repeatedly inserted insurance issues into the proceeding. In contrast, 
Dr. Walker and his counsel strictly avoided addressing the issue of insurance and pre-
authorization until the Court issued its ruling in this matter. There was no evidence that 
Dr. Walker intended to perform surgery at the time the letter was written since the letter 
was written at the request of plaintiff and the surgery did not take place until more than a 
year later. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows the trial court to exclude the 
evidence when the probative value of the same is outweighed by a danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or the potential that the jury will be mislead thereby. 
Accordingly, by analogy, it was appropriate for the trial court to give the instruction it did 
to the jury to avoid the jury being misled or Dr. Walker being unfairly prejudiced by the 
very evidence which plaintiff repeatedly tried to insert into the litigation. 
Plaintiff ignores the fact that the District Court, at plaintiffs request, gave a 
cautionary instruction to the jury. Specifically, the Court advised the jury to disregard the 
Court's earlier comments regarding the issues concerning the pre-authorization letter. 
- 4 4 -
(R.788,PP.26-27). State v. Stephens. 946 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (trial 
court's immediate cautionary instruction to the jury helped to ameliorate the harmfiilness 
or any error). 
Even if the District Court erred, plaintiff has not demonstrated any factual or legal 
basis for her argument that the instruction improperly prejudiced the case or that, absent 
the instruction, the outcome would have been any different. Since the jury found that Dr. 
Walker was not negligent and did not commit malpractice, whether he intended to 
perform surgery at the time the letter was written was not relevant to that conclusion. In 
short, one does not commit malpractice by one's "intent" at a time more than a year 
before the treatment is provided. There was an abundance of undisputed evidence that no 
negligence occurred. Any alleged error (the existence of which Dr. Walker denies) did 
not effect the juryfs verdict and was harmless at best. See Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corporation. 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
3. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY AT 
THE CLOSE OF EVIDENCE THAT THE JURY SHOULD 
CONSIDER ALL OF THE EVIDENCE IN DETERMINING 
NEGLIGENCE. ALTERNATIVELY, ANY ERROR WAS 
HARMLESS. 
Plaintiff challenges Jury Instruction #47 which helped clarify a false impression 
that occurred throughout most of the trial due to the District Court's motion in limine on 
insurance issues and plaintiffs improper attempt to benefit from that ruling. Challenges 
to jury instructions are generally reviewed under a "correctness" standard. Steffensen v. 
Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993). However, "[fjailure to give a 
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requested jury instruction constitutes reversible error only if [its] omission tends to 
mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously 
advises the jury on the law." Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Even if the Court determines error occurred, the Court will reverse only if the defendant 
shows a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the case. State v. 
Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the jury was misled by the instructions that 
were given, that such instructions were erroneous, and that the outcome of the trial was 
affected by the District Court's giving of the instructions. Plaintiff has made no attempt 
to satisfy these requirements, nor could she. The instruction merely advised the jury to 
evaluate all of the evidence that had been presented, and not to look only to an insurance 
pre-authorization letter written at plaintiffs request to retain her insurance benefits. This 
instruction merely followed other instructions given both before and after the evidence 
that jurors should consider all of the evidence and instructions as a whole, that the Judge 
may not invade the jurors' responsibility to act as the fact-finder, that the Judge does not 
favor either side and the jurors should disregard anything that made them think that the 
judge had a preference. Plaintiff was given broad license in her opening, closing, and 
presentation of evidence to prove her theory. The jury evaluated all of the evidence and 
unanimously found no negligence. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS BROAD DISCRETION 
IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
AND MOTION FOR MISTRIAL. 
Because the grant of a new trial is ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial 
court, the decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Rukavina v. 
Triatlantic Ventures. Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 126 (Utah 1997). Similarly, the appropriate 
standard in reviewing the trial court's denial of a mistrial motion is whether the court 
abused its discretion. State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997). If the trial 
court, in its discretion, concluded that the complained-of incident probably did not 
prejudice the jury, then it properly denied the motion. Id. at 1230-31. 
Plaintiff contends that the District Court abused its discretion in denying her 
motion for a new trial. (Aplt's Brief at 34.) Plaintiff does not even cite to Utah R. Civ. P. 
59, nor to any subsection of that rule as a basis for her argument. Generally, the rule 
allows the Court discretion to reexamine or correct jury verdicts that the Court believes to 
be in error, or where there is substantial doubt that the issues were fairly tried. Page v. 
Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 391 P.2d 290 (Utah 1964). 
The District Court was within its discretion in determining that this case was fairly 
tried and there was an abundance of evidence to support the verdict. Plaintiff had a long 
history of dental and skeletal problems, and came to Dr. Walker with an abnormal bite 
and a protrusion that, in her own words, made her look like a monkey. She hid from Dr. 
Walker her extensive psychiatric problems, including a fixation on her appearance. After 
further orthodontics failed, after a supportive second opinion, and after Dr. Walker spent 
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many hours discussing the surgery with plaintiff, Dr. Walker performed the surgery 
which by all objective measures was a total success. Even plaintiff was happy for some 
months. When she later expressed some cosmetic concerns, Dr. Walker appropriately 
tried to address them. Eventually, he determined that no further surgery would be 
advisable. 
Plaintiff also contends that the District Court abused its substantial discretion in 
denying a mistrial. In evaluating a denial of a motion for mistrial, "a defendant has the 
burden of persuading this court that the conduct complained of prejudiced the outcome of 
the trial.n State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 262 (Utah Ct. App.1995), cert, denied. 916 P.2d 
909 (Utah 1996). For purposes of determining whether a mistrial should have been 
granted, the overriding concern is that the parties received a fair trial. State v. Harmon, 
956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998). Plaintiff had her day in court. She presented her 
evidence in six days of testimony, with fifteen witnesses and dozens of exhibits. She now 
points to a couple of sentences in the over twelve hundred pages of trial transcripts and 
alleges that these few words unfairly prejudiced the trial. This Court should reject her 
argument. CONCLUSION 
Based upon plaintiffs failure to demonstrate any error or prejudice that resulted in 
the trial of this case, this Court should affirm the jury's verdict and the District Court's 
Judgment on the Verdict finding "No Cause of Action." 
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Respectfully submitted this day of March, 1999 to? 
6lt^taUv€u> 
JARYL L. RENCHER 
STEPHEN W. OWENS 
EPPERSON & RENCHER 
Attorneys for Appellee Crayton R. Walker, M.D. 
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APPENDIX 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT £PR J 1 1997 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH / c^: _:,^ coi.WY 
DOROTHY H. SCHMIDT, ) 
) SPECIAL VERDICT 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
CRAYTON R. WALKER, M.D., and ) Civil No. 930900754 
DEAN B. JOHNSON, D.D.S., ) Judge David S. Young 
Defendants. ) 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of 
the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of 
the issue presented, answer "Yes." If, on any issue, you find the 
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a 
preponderance or that the evidence preponderates against the issue 
presented, answer "No." This is a civil action and five of the 
seven jurors must agree on the answer to each question. 
1. Did Dr. Walker breach the applicable standard of care? 
ANSWER: YES NO } \ 
If your answer to question 1 is "No," have the foreperson sign 
this verdict and return it to the Court without answering the 
remaining questions. If your answer to question 1 is "Yes," 
proceed with the following questions. 
2. Did Dr. Johnson breach the applicable standard of care? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
3. Answer this question only if you answered question 1 
"Yes." Was the breach of the standard of care, if any, by Dr. 
Walker a proximate cause of injuries to plaintiff? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
If your answer to question 3 is "No," have the foreperson date 
and sign this verdict and return it to the Court without answering 
the remaining questions. If your answer to question 3 is "Yes," 
proceed to the following questions. 
4. Answer this question only if you answered question 2 
"Yes." Was the breach of the standard of care, if any, by Dr. 
Johnson a proximate cause of injuries to plaintiff? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
5. Was plaintiff at fault? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
6. Answer this question only if you answered question 5 
"Yes." Was the fault of plaintiff a proximate cause of her 
injuries? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
7. Considering all of the negligence or fault which you have 
found to be a proximate cause of injuries to plaintiff to total 
100%, you must now allocate the total negligence and fault among 
the parties. You will weigh the negligence/fault of each against 
the negligence/fault of the others to determine the relative 
negligence/fault of each. Answer only to those you found at fault 
above. The percentage you allocate to the parties must total 100%. 
What percent of the total do you find attributable to: 
Dottie Schmidt: % 
Dr. Johnson: % 
Dr. Walker: % 
Total: 100% 
8. What amount of money will fairly and adequately 
compensate for any damages sustained by plaintiff as a result of 
the negligence found in this case, as such damages are explained in 
the instructions given to you? 
$ 
DATED this / / day of April, 1997. 
FOREPERSON 
Jaryl L. Rencher #4903 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Walker 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOROTHY H. SCHMIDT, 
) JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
Plaintiff, ) 
CRAYTON R. WALKER, M.D., and 
DEAN B. JOHNSON, D.D.S., ) Civil No. 930900754 
) Judge David S. Young 
Defendants. ) 
This case came before the Court and was tried before a jury 
beginning on April 3, 1997, through April 11, 1997. Plaintiff was 
represented by Jay Jensen and defendant, Dr. Crayton Walker, M.D., 
was represented by Jaryl L. Rencher. Dr. Dean B. Johnson, D.D.S., 
had settled before the jury was impaneled. 
The jury and the Court heard evidence in this case as 
presented by the parties. The Court heard oral argument on 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict and reserved ruling on 
the same. Thereafter the matter was submitted to the jury by 
special verdict and responded as follows: 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a 
preponderance of the evidence. IF you find the evidence 
" 1 * 3 . 
Third J;-d«c?*' £'Strict 
MAY 2 7 1897 
SALT LAKE *;0 JKTY 
preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer 
"Yes." If, on any issue, you find the evidence is so 
equally balanced that you cannot determine a 
preponderance or that the evidence preponderates against 
the issue presented, answer "No." This is a civil action 
and five of the seven jurors must agree on the answer to 
each question. 
1. Did Dr. Walker breach the applicable standard 
of care? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If your answer to question 1 is "No," have the 
foreperson sign this verdic^ ana return it to the Court 
without answering the remaining questions. IF your 
answer to question 1 is "Yes," proceed with the following 
questions. 
* • • 
DATED this 11th day of April, 1997. 
/s/ 
FOREPERSON 
Based upon the jury's verdict in this case; and the Court's 
own judgment confirming the appropriateness of the same; and the 
Court otherwise being advised as to the law, the facts, and the 
record in this case; and finding good cause appearing therefore; 
NOW HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES: 
1. Defendant Crayton R. Walker, M.D., is granted a judgment 
in his favor with prejudice for "no cause of action;" and 
2. Dr. Walker is entitled to costs under Rule 54(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2 
T>^ 
DATED this J2y"day of TA a J^ SEafi, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JAY _ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SCHMIDT/JUDGMENT 
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